Introduction
When the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) recently hosted a public meeting in the European Parliament on the future of civil aviation, focusing on the competitive challenge and ever-increasing market share of low fares airlines (LFAs), the Group designated carriers such as Ryanair as 'sky pirates'. 1 The definition of a pirate, however, is one who steals at sea or plunders the land from the sea without commission from a sovereign state. This means that Michael O'Leary, Ryanair's CEO, is better likened to Sir Francis Drake than Captain Jack Sparrow, because Ryanair's aircraft are licensed in Ireland and all crew are employed on Irish contracts, including non-Irish nationals who are hired via an agency and work at one of the company's sixty plus bases outside the Republic of Ireland, who fly to other European countries and never set foot on Irish soil. Thus, while 'modern-day piracy' in the skies over Europe clearly involves a reconfiguration of sovereign authority in defiance of physical geography, it also depends on the commission of a sovereign state. Such commission enables LFAs, like their counterparts on the high seas (flag of convenience shipping), 2 to adopt and adapt non-territorial sovereignty as a way of redefining employment relations, exerting control over labor, and extracting surplus value. The low fares model was pioneered in the US domestic market during the 1970s by Southwest Airlines (SWA) and then copied, to a greater or lesser extent, by many other airlines. In Europe, the creation of a single European aviation market (SEAM) in the late 1980s and 1990s not only opened the market to LFAs but also signaled a shift in regulatory authority from the nation state to the supranational institutions of the European Union (EU).
However, this shift was not complete, neither in terms of aviation policy nor, in particular, social policy. As a result, wherever there are unclear delineations of national sovereignty, capital can develop new 'spatial-juridical fixes' 3 to sustain seemingly illegitimate practices (e.g. 'piracy') through a combination of 'organizational liminality' (the creative exploitation of institutional and anti-institutional elements) 4 and 'institutional deflection' (deploying internal resources to neutralize threats in the external environment). 5 During the mid-to late-1990s when brash new entrants such as Ryanair and easyJet occupied a niche on the margins of the SEAM, LFAs attracted only passing attention from established (legacy) airlines and organized labor, but they are now dominant players in the market with well over 40 per cent of all intra-EU passenger traffic, with Ryanair now classified as Europe's largest airline on this basis. In this rapidly changing context, it is perhaps unsurprising that trade unions are struggling to create their own 'spatial fix' in response to the new non-territorial spaces and management systems developed by LFAs, wedded as they are to the nation state and in the case of civil aviation to their national (flag) airline. 6 Indeed, the historical roots of aviation unionism are predominantly 'company-based', such that even aviation unions that are now incorporated into multi-modal transport unions, or multi-sector general unions, still retain a close relationship with the nation's legacy airline(s).
The continued dependence of airline unions on legacy airlines has led to political support for what Erne 7 denotes as 'democratic renationalization' (i.e. a reaffirmation of the autonomy of the nation state, not only with respect to aviation policy but also employment law and broader social protection) and practical support for 'technocratic renationalization' (i.e. national competitive strategies at the macro level and industrial restructuring and new business strategies at the micro level). This is not to suggest unquestioning support for the restructuring of national (flag) airlines, a process that has been accompanied by strikes and other forms of labor unrest across the EU, rather to highlight the imperatives of 'regime competition' 8 and the absence of any effective trade union response, to date, at the supranational level.
Regime competition originates in national institutional arrangements that are now located in and constrained by international competitive markets extending well beyond their territorial reach. 9 Firms located in less flexible and/or more costly institutional arrangements will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage and look for ways to maintain profitability, including new spatial-juridical fixes that exploit cracks in the inter-state system. 10 The ineffectiveness of trade union responses to the SEAM and new transnational business strategies, most notably those pioneered by LFAs, originates in the 'national flag' (airline) orientation of aviation unions. Moreover, the technocratic origins of the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) and its 'European technocratic strategy' (i.e. leadership interaction with EU decision-makers) 11 has distanced aviation unions from their members and, at times, from each other. When unions' engagement with the EU abdicates contentious politics in favor of industrial legality, then a 'Euro-democratization strategy' (i.e. the mobilization of aviation workers across all work spaces, contexts and job categories, their engagement in EU decision-making and their contribution to a European public sphere) 12 becomes all the more difficult. 13 Nonetheless, there is a growing recognition amongst union officials and aviation workers that the route to protecting and improving their terms and conditions of employment is no longer local (company-based) or even national, but via European or possibly global action.
If the driving force that link s workers across Europe 'is not the existence of a European market but the increasingly supranational reorganization of the firm ', 14 what are the prospects for aviation workers and trade unionism at LFAs such as Ryanair or indeed the legacy carriers that are now integrated into global airline alliances? Asked differently, when capital reorganizes labor on a transnational scale, how can workers reorganize themselves?
These questions put the firm and its workforce, rather than the market, at the heart of our analysis, but not as decoupled or autonomous actors as firms and workers not only exist within different social institutions, they are constituted of competing social relations. 15 Transnational firms, including airlines, are still dependent on the nation state for their licenses to operate and to protect their property rights, and even 'the most flighty of capital must come to ground at some point', 16 quite literally in the case of airlines, creating temporal and physical 'spaces of opportunity' for organization and action on the part of workers and trade unions. In other words, or more precisely the words of labor geography, 'Workers, too, are active geographical agents whose activities can shape economic landscapes '. 17 In what follows we draw primarily on data from two recent projects with the ETF, funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the European Sector Social Dialogue Committee for Civil Aviation, 18 as well as data collected for the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the aftermath of the most recent crises to hit the sector 19 and other research dating back over the previous two decades. 20 In the following section we review the changing terrain of Europe's single aviation market (SEAM), the business strategies developed by LFAs within this open market, and the turbulence this created for legacy airlines as they restructure their route networks, flight operations, business activities and industrial relations.
To understand the strategic choices available to trade unions and their members in the SEAM, in a subsequent section we draw on the typology developed by Erne that sets out four possible orientations that actors may take in relation to the European integration process:
Euro-democratization, Euro-technocratization, democratic renationalization and technocratic renationalization. 21 While greater or lesser emphasis is placed on different strategies at different times or in response to different actors, they are not mutually exclusive. It is often remarked, for example, that workers' voice in the technocratic decision-making process (the force of their argument) is only heard when backed by members' democratic participation in union activities, including various forms of collective action (the argument of force).
Historically, at the national and company levels, aviation unions have exploited their structural power in the labor process (their strategic location in a high risk, tightly integrated and interdependent system of flight operations) through robust forms of associational power (collective organization and representation). This has yet to be translated to the European stage. To be sure, the ETF is a recognized 'social partner' for civil aviation and is closely involved in many aspects of European aviation policy. However, without the ability to mobilize aviation workers across the EU to engage in new disruptive repertoires of collective action the 'default' position becomes one of 'bureaucratic international centralism', 22 characterized by routine functions, modest aims, and the 'lowest common denominator' in terms of aviation policy and social protection. As Ryanair is now the 'lowest common denominator' in the SEAM, we pay particular attention to this modern-day 'sky pirate'.
Exploiting Cracks in the SEAM
How markets develop spatially shapes how they develop socially (and vice versa). 23 Spatially uneven development means that some workers, in some places, at certain time s, will find themselves in a more privileged position than others, often as a result of their material interests coinciding (to a greater rather than a lesser extent) with those of capital. 24 Under the pre-SEAM system of bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) between nation states, the designated airports in the relevant BASA defined the scope of the market, both geographically and economically. With typically just two airlines on every route -the respective national Behind every competitive challenge in a capitalist economy is an innovative enterprise with superior organizational capabilities. 26 The innovative organization either produces (delivers) a superior product (service) at a competitive cost (i.e. product or service innovation) or a saleable product/service at a lower cost (i.e. process innovation). 27 Market leaders often achieve both product (service) and process innovation. LFAs are evidently highly innovative enterprises, having reduced costs significantly and redefined the very experience of flying, epitomized by Ryanair's business strategy that treats its passengers as 'self-loading cargo' 28 and its aircraft as 'just a bus with wings'. 29 The most significant cost savings secured by LFAs include:
 flying a single aircraft type and a much younger (fuel efficient) fleet, which minimizes training and maintenance costs and maximizes the flexibility of staff rostering  using secondary and less congested airports, which minimizes landing charges a nd aircraft turnaround time  maximizing the number of seats on-board the aircraft (e.g. reducing leg space, removing hot galleys, and providing only one class of seating)  'commodifying' the product by eliminating any 'extras' (e.g. complimentary in-flight food and drink) and offering the customer the option to pay separately (additionally) for an allocated seat, checked-in baggage, in-flight food and drinks, etc.
 direct selling, now almost exclusively via the internet rather than via travel agencies who charge commission  point-to-point services and one-way (single class) fares (i.e. no interlining), and  operating from a multitude of bases as the airline expands (spatially) such that staff can return to their 'home base' after every shift (i.e. no costly overnight stop-overs in a foreign country).
On short-haul (point-to-point) routes, LFAs enjoy a cost advantage over legacy airlines anywhere between 25-50 per cent. Ryanair's cost advantage is closer to 60 per cent, 30 with costs per employee less than €50,000 (in 2011-12) compared to well over €106,000 at Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), Europe's highest cost legacy airline. 31 In fact, the most significant contribution to Ryanair's low cost base comes from high labor productivity 32 and low unit labor costs (labor productivity x labor costs), with low(er) wages than its rivals and an intensive working schedule concentrated over a 9-month (summer peak) period when the majority of (temporary) staff work the maximum hours allowed under the European flight and European bases without compensation' (emphasis added). Wherever they are based, however, their 'place of work' (i.e. the aircraft) is Ireland, which is made explicit in the employee's contact with the relevant agency. 33 A further twist to this particular spatial-juridical fix is that while crew are employed on Irish contracts, their pay is determined locally through a system of (company-managed) Employee Representative Committees (ERCs) for each category of staff in each base 34 as there are no recognized trade unions in Ryanair. All other operational activities, such as check-in, ground handling, fuelling, maintenance, etc., are subcontracted to independent third parties, which is a particularly effective way for the employer to cut costs, shed responsibility, increase flexibility and disempower the workforce. 35 Thus, when Ireland (the aircraft) does 'come to ground' it invariably lands in a union-free zone (i.e. a secondary airport where airlines, service providers and the local state are keen to keep costs as low as possible, especially labor costs). In effect, these airports can be likened to Export Processing Zones where worker and trade union rights are more explicitly restricted.
When LFAs first entered the European market the response of national (flag) airlines was essentially 'studied neglect' because the newcomers rarely competed head on with legacy airlines (i.e. flights to/from the same airports). Experimentation followed as legacy airlines introduced their own LFAs, with BA creating Go, KLM introducing Buzz, and SAS operating Snowflake. In several cases, however, these new start-ups took traffic from the legacy's own short-haul network, rather than new entrants such as Ryanair and easyJet, and they were soon sold to rivals (esayJet bought Go and Ryanair bought Buzz) or disbanded (Snowflake).
The primary focus of the legacy airlines has been to defend, and extend, their long haul services, which typically account for around 40 per cent of revenue but as much as 90 per cent of operating profit. Legacy restructuring has involved a number of 'mergers', including Air France-KLM and BA-Iberia, and 'takeovers' (e.g. Lufthansa buying into Swiss, Brussels Airlines and Austrian Airlines), but the most significant development has been the formation and extension of global alliances. 36 This has allowed legacy airlines to 'retreat' to their 'home hub(s)' and offer an 'anywhere to anywhere' service via the alliance network. But they still need domestic (i.e. European) feed. As a result, some LFAs have been welcomed into global alliances in order to add more (short haul) destinations (e.g. oneworld-airberlin) or brought into airline groups (e.g. IAG-Vueling).
The most recent response has been to grow a 'low cost version' of the main brand for short-haul routes, intended not so much to mimic the LFAs as to address structural problems (legacy labor costs) within the legacy airline's network. Germanwings, for example, is Lufthansa's 'solution' for its non-hub services (i.e. all flights except those to/from Frankfurt and Munich) with cabin crew paid 40 per cent less at Germanwings than mainline Lufthansa crew and with much slower progression up the pay scale. 37 The on-going restructuring of legacy airlines is a reflection of their inability to close the cost gap on LFAs, especially labor costs, 38 and the competitive challenges they continue to face in both their short-haul and most recently their long-haul markets. As LFAs reach 'saturation point' in the new markets they have developed using secondary airports, their attention has recently turned to primary airports that have traditionally been dominated by legacy airlines. 39 In many areas of their business, LFAs are finding it increasingly difficult to find further cost savings, with many now seeking to 'grow revenue' (e.g. targeting business class passengers) or further extend the geographical reach of their route network using the new generation of more fuel-efficient aircraft. easyJet, for example, already offers flights to and conditions, the airline experienced its first ever strike in Norway (a 'one-man' strike by René-Charles Gustavsen, the workers' member on the NAS board, for a period of 12 days).
The dispute in Norway, combined with a postponement of a legal work conflict in Denmark by the mediator, which meant that a strike was never more than 4 to 19 days away, forced the company to agree common terms and conditions and stall the outsourcing of cabin crew in Denmark.
In the case of Ryanair, however, when the airline moved from a 'home hub' (Dublin) to a multi-base strategy across the SEAM, with aviation unions (quite literally) 'missing the flight', national trade union strategies have faltered. This is not to gainsay the potential of national trade union strategies, as witnessed by the organization of easyJet following the introduction of a statutory union recognition procedure in the UK (the Employment Relations Act, 1999), which first pilots and then cabin crew were able to use to secure collective bargaining rights. But national employment laws and domestic class compromises appear increasingly fragile as political parties across Europe move to the right and transnational firms position their operations in the interstices of prevailing regulative, normative and socio-spatial systems. 42 It is much harder for unions to organize these spaces when they are simply 'spaces of engagement' for workers and not 'places of dependence'. As Herod notes, 'Having an island of stability in which to stand in a sea of global change may provide the necessary support and traditions upon which workers can dra w to defend their interests'. 43 But when workers are employed in a foreign land, on short-term contracts, spending most of their working time 'in the air', there is very little stability in their lives.
The (in)effectiveness of union strategies on the development of the European polity can be considered along two dimensions -the decision-making level and decision-making process -to create the typology depicted in Figure 1 . 44 'Insiders' with access to EU decision-makers tend to favor a Euro-technocratization strategy 57 and as a recognized social partner the ETF is well versed in the 'politics of expertise' favored by the European Commission. Indeed, the ETF has relied historically on the 'force of argument' rather than the 'argument of force'. The main aims of the 'Brussels Committee', as the ETF was formerly known, 58 were to 'represent the interests of transport workers' unions to the institutions of the European Community', recognizing that 'the coordination of international solidarity … is primarily a matter for the ITF'. 59 All too often, however, and certainly during the recent tenure of Siim Kallas as Transport Commissioner , the Commission (DG Move) has been unwilling to accept the force of labor's arguments, which are rarely seen as compatible with the EU's free-market objectives. Thus, the primary limits of Euro-technocratization lie not in a lack of access to EU institutions but the 'insulation' of EU decision-makers 'from the dysfunctional aspirations of citizens by other means -namely, through a restriction of the realm of legitimate claims that social actors can make'. 60 When legitimate claims fail, trade unions need to develop less conventional repertories of collective action (the transnational argument of force).
More often, however, it seems that when European trade union federations become embroiled in the comitology of the EU 61 -which is probably as far removed from the capacities and inclinations of local union organizations and their members as it is possible to be -they are enveloped in an 'elite embrace' accompanied by the suppression of both political alternatives and mobilization capacity. 62 To be sure, deliberative institutions at the supranational (EU) level can provide trade unions with strategic capacities they would not otherwise enjoy, but the democratic involvement of rank-and-file union members is often sacrificed and decision-making processes and agreements that are struck at this level are not Ryanair has indicated that it will only consider recognition if and when the RPG has a majority of pilots in membership, a milestone it in fact reached in the first quarter of 2014, but has so far resisted any involvement of the RPG in local negotiations and has even threatened pilots with discipline if they wear the RPG lanyard with their ID pass. Despite this oppression, the RPG provides a network that connects pilots across Europe and is an important outlet for discourses of identity building and solidarity that are needed to create a 'we-feeling' and a sense of belonging to a common polity. Put differently, the RPG creates a bridge across the horizontal spatial divide between workers' organizations in different countries where Ryanair has its bases. It also fords the vertical gaps in the international system between local, national and transnational levels of union organization and representation. Thus, while the RPG will deal with Ryanair on any pan-European issues, all pilots are also encouraged to join their local 'home base' pilots' association and almost twothirds now hold 'dual membership'. As Erne notes, 'if there is to be a Europeanization of organized labor, it must take place not only in the EU-level structures but also within the respective national-, local-, and firm-level union organizations'. 67 The extension of the low cost model to long-haul (inter-continental) routes demands a further level of union organization.
The potential for 'flags of convenience' (FoC) on trans-Atlantic routes was the major concern of aviation unions when they persuaded US and EU officials to hold a forum on The Ministry subsequently wrote to the European Commission (DG Move) to highlight the fact that: 'Discrepancies between national legislation within the EU/EEA may result in a nonlevel playing field, both on operations within the EU/EEA and on operations between EU/EEA and third countries'. 70 For example, crew working for an EU/EEA air carrier may 'check in' on day one at a formal 'home base' in a third country (typically South East Asia or the Middle East), after which they travel to Europe and work on flights between EU/EEA countries for ten days, returning to the 'home base' and 'checking out' on day twelve. If they are accommodated by the airline while in Europe and receive compensation for food expenses then the airline will circumvent the amendments to the new 'home base' rule (labor's spatial counter-fix). In effect, therefore, the NAS strategy not only opens the inter-continental market to low cost competition from an Asian 'crew of convenience' but also the intra-European market, potentially undercutting even Ryanair. However, despite the threat posed to labor on both sides of the Atlantic there was very little concerted opposition to NAI's application for an Irish AOC, certainly not at a supranational (EU) level. Nor was there any coordinated trans-Atlantic action, rather a largely separate and sequential campaign to prevent NAI obtaining a Foreign Air Carrier permit in the USA. While the Transport Trades Department (AFL-CIO) persuaded the House of Representatives to defer a decision on NAI's application, this hardly constitutes the arrest of a 'sky pirate' or evidence of a 'scale shift' that denotes international democratization.
Conclusion
In a SEAM where cracks have appeared as a result of LFAs innovative business strategies that exploit non-territorial sovereignty in order to reconfigure employment relationships and industrial relations, aviation unions have continued to focus predominantly on their national place rather than new European spaces opened up by the SEAM. They tend to view transnational activity, by and large, through the lens of challenges facing their national (flag) airline, neglecting to organize the many contract and temporary workers, domestic and foreign, who work for the LFAs. When they do turn their attention to the LFAs, they often find that national level strategies, whether democratic or technocratic, are easily deflected by airlines that have created new European spatial-juridical fixes to exert control over labor and extract surplus value.
LFAs in general, and the 'sky pirates' in particular, are far less embedded in national institutions and industrial relations when compared to trans-national corporations in other sectors such as manufacturing. To be sure, they still depend on the nation state for an AOC and are more than willing to exploit and export weak(er) systems of employment protection, social security and industrial relations via the 'place of work' (the aircraft). However, whereas manufacturing firms exploit labor as a 'factor of location' as well as a 'factor of production' (e.g. drawing on local traditions of work and skills in a particular economic activity), LFAs seek to 'dis-embed' labor from the country of origin and contractually distance aircrew from their ultimate employer. Even the new 'home base' -labor's counter spatial-juridical fix -is unlikely to be the worker's 'natural home'. This makes union organization all the more difficult, certainly in the absence of a supranational strategy (a 'scale shift') that combines an engagement with EU institutions as well as the involvement of aviation workers in new transnational organizations and networks that can develop new repertories of (disruptive) collective action. A strategy of institutional access (European technocracy), w ithout direct (democratic) action to back it up, or the force of argument without the argument of force, can lead to dependence and division, as the ETF has discovered to its cost. Euro-democratization, however, is still underdeveloped, suggesting there is little prospect, at least in the immediate future, of arresting the 'sky pirates' who plunder European skies and threaten to do the same over the Atlantic. 
